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11.1. INTRODUCTION  
The question is: how much income inequality is acceptable? All modern 
nations engage in active income redistribution and have a system that taxes 
the wealthy to a greater extent than the poor. Redistributive policies are 
accompanied by a continuous discussion on the question of how much income 
inequality is justified (Pen and Tinbergen, 1977; Sen, 1997). This discussion 
has an important ideological component: egalitarians claim that all people are 
equal and that wealth is generated by society as a whole. They conclude that 
the benefits of our wealth should therefore be equally shared. Libertarians 
stress the fundamental right to property and claim that wealth is the result of 
free enterprise. Their ideal is a form of ‘limited government’ that does not 
interfere with the spontaneous evolution of income differences. As these 
principles are incompatible, egalitarians and libertarians can at best 
compromise. 
 Since an agreement on principles is unlikely, one can seek a consequential 
criterion to clarify things. One can look, for example, at the effects of income 
inequality on economic growth. It is often argued that that economic freedom 
and the resulting inequality stimulate economic growth and that most people 
want economic growth (Layard and Walters, 1978). This is the moral basis 
for the current (neo-) liberal policies that dominate in most of the Western 
world. 
 Not everyone agrees that we should aim at continuous economic growth. 
As material wealth keeps cumulating, the necessity for additional growth 
becomes less obvious and this reflects in ‘diminished happiness returns’ 
(Easterlin, 1974) and in the growing support for ‘post-materialistic values’ 
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(Inglehart, 1990). Moreover, a lack of resources and potential damage to the 
environment might restrict the desirability of further economic growth. 
 In the consequentialistic debate on income inequality there are other 
criteria than just the effects on economic growth. Most people agree that even 
the poorest should be able to fulfil at least their basic needs and that income 
differences should not be so extreme that the societal order is endangered. 
However, it is not easy to establish what needs qualify as ‘basic’ or when 
social order is at risk. It is even more difficult to quantify the possible 
consequences of income inequality. In this chapter we apply another criterion 
and consider the effect of income inequality on ‘happiness’. We thereby go 
back to Jeremy Bentham (1789), who placed happiness at the core of his 
‘utilitarian’ moral philosophy.  
 Utilitarianism is the philosophy that judges good and evil on the basis of 
‘utility’, and its  founding father, Jeremy Bentham (1789), thought of utility 
as ‘happiness’. In his view, the moral value of any action should be judged in 
terms of its effect on happiness, the best action being the one which yields the 
‘the greatest happiness for the greatest number’. The application of this 
principle to policy is called ‘rule utilitarianism’. Bentham defined happiness 
as ‘the sum of pleasures and pains’, which is in line with the modern 
definition of happiness as the ‘subjective appreciation of one’s life as a 
whole’ (Veenhoven, 1984). 
 This approach is quite suitable for answering how much income inequality 
is acceptable. First, there is considerable agreement on the desirability of 
happiness. We know this from surveys that indicate that citizens value 
happiness more than many other ‘end state values’ (Goddijn et. al., 1979: 62, 
Inglehart, 1985:110). Secondly, happiness is a ‘highest order concept’ that 
incorporates many other criteria of ‘quality of life’. Thirdly, happiness has 
successfully been measured and data exist that make it possible to make a 
comparison between various nations and various income policies 
(Veenhoven, 1998). 
 In the (standard) utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham, the focus is on the 
average level of happiness in society. A common objection is that the 
happiness of the greatest number can be attained at the cost of unhappiness of 
a minority and that utilitarian ethics are compatible with the violation of 
individual rights and interests. In this context it is wise to also take 
differences in happiness into account. We call this variant egalitarian 
utilitarianism. It is egalitarian in the sense that equal outcomes are valued 
positively. However, it does not stress income equality, as standard 
egalitarianism does, but equality in terms of happiness. Following an 
egalitarian utilitarian approach, policy makers should favour small differences 
in happiness over greater happiness. Both the standard utilitarian and the 
egalitarian utilitarian approach are followed in the current study. 
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11.2. EARLIER RESEARCH 
A pioneer study was reported by Morawetz (1977), who compared two Israeli 
‘Kibbutz’. These cooperative settlements were similar in terms of size, 
religious orientation (Jewish), age distribution and so on. The most noticeable 
difference between the two Kibbutz was that in one Kibbutz each family had 
the same income, whereas the other Kibbutz allowed income differences. 
Average happiness appeared to be higher in the former Kibbutz than in the 
latter. On that basis Morawetz concluded that income inequality reduces 
happiness, while also admitting that the design of this study was far from 
perfect.  
 The findings of Morawetz fit the intuition of many later scientists who 
believe that happiness depends on social comparison (Ball and Chernova, 
2004). In this view, people can derive unhappiness from comparing their 
level of wealth with the wealth of others, and in that line Clark (2003) claims 
that in Great Britain, comparing oneself with high income groups is linked to 
low life-satisfaction. Income inequality, then, is unpleasant for those who earn 
less than others (Luttmer, 2004), although even low income individuals might 
be able to compare themselves with worse off comparison groups. Senik 
(2002) reports that Russians are actually more satisfied when people in their 
surroundings, the ‘reference group’, earn more. Apparently, other people’s 
fortune does not have to be a source of frustration, but can also be a source of 
inspiration and hope (Clark, 2003). This will especially be the case, according 
to Senik, when society is unstable and social mobility great. In such 
circumstances, people will not be bothered by a short-term hierarchy, they 
will focus on long-term aspirations. Eggers et al. (2006) found that Russian 
respondents, both working and unemployed, are happier in regions with high 
unemployment rates. According to these authors, inequality in Russia is a 
side-effect of (positive) capitalist reforms1.  
 A related question is whether income inequality also influences average 
happiness in a region. Different studies have come up with different answers. 
Some authors claim that people are happier in US states where income 
differences are smallest (, Kaplan et al., 1996; Kawachi and Kennedy, 1997; 
Blanchflower and Oswald, 2003). However, Alesina et al. (2004) found no 
such difference across US states. Likewise, Senik (2002) found no effect of 
income inequality across regions in Russia. Reversely, Clark (2003) and 
Tomes (1986) report positive effects of income inequality on subjective well-
being, Clark’s study being based on the general population in different 
English regions and Tomes’ study on males in different districts in Canada.  
 The first cross-national study on income inequality and its effects involved 
13 nations in the 1970s and a negative relationship between income inequality 
and happiness was found (Veenhoven, 1984). Alesina et al. (2004) found a 
similar pattern in 12 European nations over the years 1975 1992, but no such 
difference across US states. One explanation is that Europeans are more 
‘inequality averse’ than Americans. A second explanation could be that the 
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social mobility is greater in the US, and income differences hence less 
definitive and less threatening2 3. 
 Veenhoven (2002) updated his previous analysis and compared 45 nations 
in the 1990s. In this larger set of nations he found no relationship between 
income inequality and average happiness. He did find a curvilinear 
relationship between the wealth of nations and average happiness and 
concluded that we can apparently live with relative income differences, but 
not with poverty in an absolute sense. Likewise, Fahey and Smith (2004) 
found no correlation in 33 European nations in 1999, while Bjørnskov et al. 
(2007) did not find any correlation for 60 nations in the years 1999 2004. In 
the latter analysis acceptance of income-inequality and level of democracy 
were controlled. 
11.3. METHOD 
In this section, we take another look at the relationship between income 
inequality and happiness in nations. The current study is different from the 
studies mentioned above in six respects: 
1. We considered a greater number of nations than ever before, using a 
dataset that involves 119 nations for the years 2000 to 2006.We 
considered average level of happiness in nations, and disparity in 
happiness between citizens. 
2. We considered overall happiness, and two ‘components’ of happiness: an 
affective component called mood and a cognitive component called 
contentment. 
3. We inspected whether there is a statistical relationship, and considered 
the shape of that relationship.  
4. We made scatter plots and looked for a turning point after which greater 
inequality in incomes results in a lower level of happiness and greater 
difference in happiness. 
5. Contrary to some of the above discussed studies, we restricted our 
analyses to the nation level. 
6. We deliberately used simple techniques, that is, scatter plots, correlations 
and partial correlations.  
 
This study was based on 119 nations, which is more than any earlier study. 
The number of cases is important for several reasons. First, national 
happiness is not only determined by the level of income inequality, but by 
many other factors as well. Maximizing the number of nations allowed us to 
reduce the influence of cultural and local circumstances that have nothing to 
do with income inequality. A second reason is that an increased number of 
cases were expected to help us to get a better perspective on the shape of the 
relationships. We focused on the shape of the relationships, because these are 
not necessarily linear. The strength and even the direction of the relationship 
might be different for different levels of income inequality. Such non-linear 
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patterns could not be identified in earlier correlational research. Since the 
question is what degree of income inequality is acceptable, we looked for a 
level where inequality started to hurt happiness, and also for a possible 
optimal level of inequality. A third reason to study as many nations as 
possible is that this enables us to split up the data into subsets. We conducted 
additional analyses for the Western world, Eastern Europe, Latin America, 
Asia and Africa. 
 As noted above, great happiness of a great number might be attained at the 
cost of great unhappiness of a small number. This could be the case here, 
since income inequality may be to the advantage of rich, well educated 
groups, but to the disadvantage of poor, vulnerable groups. A large body of 
literature suggests that things work this way (Wilkinson, 2005). If so, 
inequality in income does not necessarily undermine average happiness, but it 
must go together with inequality in happiness. We tested whether this was the 
case.     
 Happiness is conceived as subjective enjoyment of one’s life as a whole. 
Thus defined happiness is synonym with life-satisfaction. In evaluating their 
lives, people draw on two sources of information, which can be seen as sub-
totals in the appraisal process. The first source is how well they feel most of 
the time. This is known as the ‘affective component’ of happiness and called 
mood in this chapter. The second source of information is to what extent life 
meets the standards they have in mind. This is known as the ‘cognitive 
component’ of happiness and called contentment. Veenhoven (2009a) claims 
that the affective component of happiness draws on universal human needs, 
while the cognitive component rather draws on culturally variable wants. He 
presents evidence that the affective component dominates in the overall 
evaluation of life and concludes on this basis that happiness is universal 
rather than culturally relative (Veenhoven, 2010). 
 Possibly, these happiness variants relate differently to income inequality. 
Effects of income inequality due to social comparison will mainly manifest in 
the cognitive component, while effects due to need gratification will reflect in 
the affective component. In the case of opposite and comparable effects on 
both of these components, there is no correlation with overall happiness. In 
this study we therefore took a differentiated view on happiness. 
 Most of the abovementioned studies deal with the question of whether 
there is a correlation between income inequality and happiness and use 
statistics that assume linearity, without checking this assumption. We were in 
addition interested in possible non-linear patterns, and in particular in 
attempting to find a turning point beyond which income inequality begins to 
threaten happiness.    
 Several of the abovementioned studies use individual (happiness) data and 
include the income inequality of the country of residence as if this is an 
individual variable (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2003; Alesina et al., 2004). 
An often mentioned advantage is that this method drastically increases the 
number of observations (N) in comparison to any macro-level study. Yet this 
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is no real gain, since the (independent) variable of interest is still a 
characteristic of the nation. Since this approach is restricted to nations for 
which micro data are available, it does not increase, but rather decreases the 
number of relevant observations. Alesina et al. (2004), for example, draw on 
data for no more than 12 nations!  
 Another frequently mentioned advantage of the ‘micro-level method’ is 
that it allows researchers to control for individual characteristics such as age, 
sex, personality and personal circumstances. This is also a mixed blessing. 
Such controls can also distort the view of the net effects of income inequality. 
For instance, to control for unemployment may disguise a positive effect of 
income inequality on work incentives and labour supply. The question at 
hand here is how income inequality works out for happiness of the greatest 
number, and for this reason it is better not to filter out individual differences. 
11.4. VARIABLES AND ANALYSIS 
The independent variable incomeinequality in nations was measured using the 
Gini-coefficient (see Annex 11.A). The data were taken from the World Bank 
World Development Indicators (2007) for the period 1993 2004.4 An 
alternative measure of income inequality, not used in this article, is the ratio 
income of the richest 20 percent and income of the poorest 20 percent. An 
advantage of that latter measure is that it does not require information on the 
complete income distribution. However, this measure is somewhat less 
sensitive than the Gini-coefficient to possible measurement problems that 
might arise in poor nations where data might be unreliable.  
 As note above, we considered not only overall happiness, but also the 
cognitive component of happiness contentment and the affective component 
mood. 
 Happiness, the dependent variable, was measured using responses to the 
question: ‘Taking all together, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your 
life as a whole these days?’ The responses were rated on a numerical scale 
ranging from 1 (dissatisfied) to 10 (satisfied).5 The level of happiness was 
quantified using the average of responses in a nation6 and disparity in 
happiness was measured using the standard-deviation,7 following Kalmijn 
and Veenhoven (2005). 
 Contentment was measured using responses to the question: ‘Here is a 
picture of a ladder. Suppose the top of the ladder represents the best possible 
life (10) for you and the bottom of the ladder the worst possible life (0). 
Where on this ladder do you feel you personally stand at the present time?’ 
As for happiness, the level of contentment was then assessed using the 
average8 and dispersion in contentment using the standard deviation.9  
 Mood was measured using responses to 14 questions about affects of a 
respondent during the preceding day of the survey. A typical question was: 
’Did you experience the following feelings a lot during the day? How about 
enjoyment?’ Answer categories were ‘yes’ or ’no’. The level of mood was 
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then quantified using an affect balance score that reflected the degree to 
which positive responses outweighed negative affects.10 Note: the data do not 
allow a standard deviation to be determined. 
 The Control variable was wealth. It is possible that income inequality has 
different effects for nations that differ in their level of national wealth. 
Hypothetically, income inequality could be more functional in poor countries 
than in rich nations, but this positive effect for poor nations may be disguised 
by the lower happiness in poor countries. For this reason, we controlled for 
wealth. Wealth was operationalized in our research as gross domestic product 
per capita, adjusted for purchasing power: that is, the different currencies 
were transformed into one common currency, and the differences in price 
levels, of standardized sets of goods, were equalized. The data were taken 
from the World Bank.11.  
 All the above variables can be found in the data file ‘States of Nations’ 
(Veenhoven, 2009b) which forms part of the World Database of Happiness. 
This database is available on request. The relevant cases and scores are 
presented in Annex 11.B.
 Our analyses involved three steps. First, we computed zero-order 
correlations in the entire set of 119 nations, to see if there was any 
relationship. We also made scatter plots to inspect these relationships in more 
detail, and in particular to identify possible non-linear patterns. We looked 
for a level of inequality that is optimal for happiness and also for a possible 
turning point beyond which happiness declines. Second,  we checked whether 
purchasing power functions as a suppressor variable, using partial 
correlations. Third, , as a last step we did a separate analysis for different 
parts of the world to identify possible cultural variations. In this context we 
inspected whether the pattern in the Western world differs from other parts of 
the world.  
 We only report (partial) correlations and leave out the corresponding p-
values. The p-value represents the chance of a ‘type I error’: that is,a 
difference in the sample that does not reflect a difference in the population as 
a whole. When this chance is sufficiently small, smaller than 5 percent for 
example, it can be concluded that the observed difference should not be 
attributed to the sample, but to real differences in the population. In other 
words: there is only a small chance that using another sample will make the 
difference go away. The concept of ‘sample’ is not relevant here, however, 
since we use all the nations in which happiness and income inequality have 
been measured. As the concept of ‘type I error’ does not apply in such a 
context, claims about statistical significance are meaningless.  
 
11.5. RESULTS 
The correlation results are presented in Table 11.1. Below, we will discus 
these results beginning with column two. 
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Table 11.1 Correlations between income inequality and happiness in 11912  
nations 
 
 Level 
of happiness 
(mean) 
Inequality 
in happiness 
(standard deviation) 
Overall life-satisfaction 
Zero-order correlation - 0.08 + 0.21 
Partial correlation controlling 
wealth 
+ 0.28 - 0.01 
 
Contentment 
Zero-order correlation - 0.26 + 0.21 
Partial correlation controlling 
wealth 
+ 0.14 - 0.01 
 
Mood 
Zero-order correlation + 0.12 n.a. 
Partial correlation controlling 
wealth 
+ 0.28 n.a. 
 
How does income inequality relate to average happiness in nations? At first 
sight the results are ambiguous, but on a closer look a slight positive 
relationship appears. 
 Overall happiness is when using the zero-order correlation in this set of 
119 nations is minus 0.08.13 This suggests that there is no substantial 
statistical relationship between income inequality and average happiness on a 
global level, and inspection of the scatter plot shows that there is no non-
linear relation. Consequently there is no view of an optimal level of income 
inequality. 
 As noted above, differences in national wealth can distort the picture and 
for that reason we partialled wealth out. This resulted in a positive relation, 
the partial correlation being +0.28. Inspection of a plot of residuals confirms 
this, see Figure 11.1. So income inequality seems to work positively on the 
level of happiness. 
 
Figure 11.1 Income inequality and income-adjusted happiness in 119 nations 
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The relation with contentment is different at first sight. In more unequal 
nations, people are less apt to rate their life as successful (r =  minus 0.26). 
However, when wealth was controlled, the direction of the relationship 
changed to positive (rp = +0.14). As in the case of happiness this denotes a 
modest positive effect. Inspection of the scatter plot (not shown14) did not 
reveal any non-linear pattern. 
  The relationship between income inequality and average mood is most in 
line with the libertarian view, both the zero-order correlation (r = +0.12) and 
the partial correlation (rp = +0.28) indicate a positive relationship. Again 
inspection of the scatter plots did not reveal a non-linear pattern (plots not 
shown).    
 The zero-order correlations showed that income inequality goes together 
with slightly lower contentment, but with better mood and these opposed 
effects resulted in a non-relationship with overall happiness. This would mean 
that the positive and negative effects of income inequality tend to balance out 
and consequently this consequential approach does not answer the question of 
what degree of income inequality is acceptable. This conclusion can be 
criticized, however, since control for wealth reveals a positive relation with 
all three happiness variants. So in the end positive effects seem to prevail, at 
least so far as the average level of happiness in a nation is concerned. 
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11.6. INCOME INEQUALITY AND INEQUALITY 
OFHAPPINESS IN NATIONS 
As noted earlier, a great average happiness score of a nation does not 
necessarily imply that every citizen in that nation is happy. For that reason, 
we also study the inequality of happiness in nations. When the inequality of 
happiness is low in a nation, there is less reason to assume that the happiness 
of the majority in that nation is at the expense of an unhappy minority. We 
measured inequality of happiness using the standard deviation of responses to 
single item questions about overall life satisfaction and contentment. Standard 
deviation on mood was not available. The results are in Table 11.1. 
 In nations that have great income inequality, the inequality in happiness is 
also somewhat greater (r = +0.21). Although we concluded before that 
average happiness is not undermined by income inequality, income inequality 
is associated with inequality of happiness within nations. Again control for 
wealth changes the picture and eliminates the positive relationship (rp = minus 
0.01). Inspection of the scatter plot did not reveal any non-linear pattern. See 
Figure 11.2. 
 
Figure 11.2 Income inequality and income-adjusted inequality of happiness 
in 119 nations 
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The results for contentment were almost identical to the results for overall 
happiness. Income inequality is positively correlated with inequality in 
contentment (r = +0.21). This relationship disappears when wealth is 
controlled for (rp = minus 0.01). 
 At first sight inequality of incomes seems to go with inequality of 
happiness and this would suggest that income inequality is not compatible 
with egalitarian utilitarianism. Yet when the wealth of the nation is taken into 
account, this relation disappears, which means that income inequality works 
out neutrally from this ethical perspective.  
11.7. PATTERNS IN PARTS OF THE WORLD 
Quite different patterns appear when we split the nations into subgroups 
worldwide. For instance in the Western world, here defined as the US, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Western-European countries, we found 
a strong negative relationship between income inequality and happiness, even 
after controlling for wealth. In Eastern Europe the picture is quite different: 
after controlling for wealth, there is a slight positive relationship between 
income inequality and wealth. The same applied for Asia and Latin America. 
In Africa there is no meaningful relationship. 
 The results are also not robust when we look at the disparity in happiness. 
In Asia, greater income inequality is associated with greater inequality in 
happiness, however, the reverse is true for Latin America, Africa and Western 
Europe, while for Eastern Europe, there is no relationship.  
 This erratic pattern is probably due to the small size of the sub-sets, in 
which random variation disguises the view on the effects of income 
inequality. 
 
11.8. DISCUSSION 
The leading question was how much income inequality is acceptable in a 
utilitarian perspective. The answer is that we could not identify a particular 
turning point, but that the data suggest a modest positive effect of income 
inequality within the range that exists in the present day world. Greater 
income differences in a nation go together with somewhat greater happiness 
of the average citizen and do not create greater inequality of happiness. This 
means that income inequality is acceptable from a utilitarian perspective, at 
least the degree of inequality that exists in the present day world. This 
conclusion can not necessarily be generalized to every single nation or to 
every single person within such a nation. Moreover, even for those 
individuals who benefit from income inequality, this benefit is probably the 
net effect of both pros and cons. Still, for the average person the benefits of 
income inequality seem to somewhat outweigh the downsides.  This result will 
strike many readers as counterintuitive. Can this be true? Below we will 
consider how these findings fit earlier research, then we will discuss some 
possible explanations, lastly we address some political implications.  
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 This is not the first study to find a positive relationship between income 
inequality and happiness in nations. As noted above, similar finding have 
been reported by Senik (2002), Eggers et al. (2006), Clark (2003) and Tomes 
(1986). Moreover, many researchers have found no relationship, either 
positive or negative, between income inequality and happiness (Veenhoven, 
2002; Bjornskov et al.., 2007; Fahey and Smith, 2004). The results of this 
study are also compatible with earlier research on social security and 
happiness in nations, which have found no greater happiness in nations that 
spend a lot on social security compared to equally wealthy nations that 
practice ‘residual welfare’ (Veenhoven, 2000; Ouweneel, 2002). Yet our 
results do not fit with all the previous research. 
 As noted above, there are also reports of a negative relationship between 
income inequality and happiness. Most of these studies concern income 
inequality in regions and that is not the same as income inequality in nations. 
Possibly, the negative effects of income inequality are greater in regions or in 
cities, for example due to greater visibility triggering social comparison. It is 
also possible that the potential benefits of inequality manifest mainly at the 
national level, for example due to a more optimal allocation of labour. So the 
results of these studies do not necessarily contradict ours. Negative effects at 
the local level can exist side by side with positive effects at the national level. 
  Still, in a much cited paper Alesina et al. (2004) claim that happiness is 
lower in nations where income inequality is high. How can that be? A first 
thing to note is that the observed difference in happiness is modest. Among 
American states Alenina et al. found no significant effect, in spite of their 
large sample. In Europe they did find a significant effect in an even larger 
sample, but the size of the effect is not great.15 The second answer is that 
Alesina et al. performed an individual level analysis on pooled surveys, in 
which they controlled for a large set of individual characteristics. However, 
some of these characteristics, such as employment status, could actually be 
influenced by the degree of income inequality in the country. As egalitarian 
societies are necessarily characterized by ‘pay productivity gaps’ and 
employers are not willing to pay an employee more than his productivity, it 
can at least be hypothesized that income equality leads to greater 
unemployment. Alesina et al. should not have controlled for employment 
status, as high employment might be a positive effect of income inequality. 
The third answer is that Alenina et al. used data from only 12 West-European 
nations over the years 1975 1992. These were the EU member states: 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany (West), Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK. These are almost 
the same nations as those studied in the first study by Veenhoven (1984), 
among which he also found a negative relationship between income inequality 
and happiness. In this small set the tendency is heavily titled by Denmark and 
the Netherlands, where income inequality is low and the level of happiness 
high. As noted above, we observed the same pattern when considering the 
subset of 20 western nations.   
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 Is the effect of income inequality on happiness then fully context 
dependent? The observed differences across parts of the world can be 
interpreted in that vein and in that line one can maintain that income 
inequality undermines happiness in at least some regions of the world. Yet the 
small number of observations in each separate region makes it impossible to 
be sure. It is equally well possible that there is a universal effect of income 
inequality on happiness, which is not as well visible everywhere, due to 
variation in unrelated country characteristics. Our finding of a slight positive 
effect in this set of 119 nations fits that latter view and when controlling for 
wealth we have captured a lot of cultural variation. So for the time being, we 
conclude that income-inequality tends to work out positively on happiness, 
although contextual variation is still a possibility.  
 
11.9. EXPLANATIONS 
Why do we see so little relation between income inequality and happiness in 
nations? And why is the tendency positive rather than negative?  Several 
explanations come to mind. 
 A common objection is that happiness, or related concepts, cannot be 
meaningfully compared across cultures, both because the very concept is 
culturally variable and/or because of a cultural measurement bias. If so, 
happiness should also be unrelated to other macro variables, such as wealth, 
democracy and human rights. Yet this appears not to be the case. Cross-
national research has rather found very strong correlations with various 
societal characteristics which together explain about 75 percent of the large 
differences in happiness across nations (for example Ott, 2005). So the lack 
of correlation with income inequality cannot be attributed to the insensitivity 
of happiness. 
 Another explanation could be that most nations have income distributions 
that match the wishes of the majority of the population. Politicians have stong 
incentives to be in touch with the political preferences of (large groups of) 
voters. Similarly, voter preferences might be strongly influenced by the 
(familiar) policies of the status quo. It is hard to imagine that policies or 
political philosophies that are not supported by society can survive in a 
democracy for long periods of time. Although the level of income inequality 
differs significantly between nations, the satisfaction with the level of income 
inequality might be more or less the same (at least in democratic nations). If 
this is indeed the case, it might explain why income inequality is not 
negatively correlated with average happiness in nations. In this line Berg 
(2007) found a stronger correlation between income inequality and happiness 
in countries were income-inequality is more accepted by the general public. 
Yet this analysis was based on only 14 nations and it is unclear whether 
policies are made in reaction to the preferences of citizens or that the 
preferences of citizens adjust to whatever policies exist in a certain period of 
time. 
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 It is important to stress once more that critics of income inequality may 
still have valid points when stressing the downsides of income inequality, 
however, most negative effects can co-exist with positive effects of similar 
and even greater size. It is not difficult to think of negative effects of income 
inequality, since these are spelled out in great detail in the literature, e.g. by 
Sennett and Cobb (1993) in their book ‘The Hidden Injuries of Class’. The 
challenge is rather to identify the benefits of income inequality. 
 In this context a plausible explanation could be that income inequality 
reduces happiness in the short term, while boosting the economy. In this view, 
a negative effect of incomeinequality as such is balanced by a positive effect 
of economic growth. If so, controlling for the wealth of the nation should 
reveal a negative correlation between income inequality and happiness. Yet, 
this is not the case. When we control for purchasing power for the world as a 
whole, the partial correlation is not negative, but positive (+0.28). People 
appear to be happier in unequal nations than in equal nations that are equally 
wealthy. Still, this explanation can apply to nations where the negative effects 
of income inequality are felt while its benefits cannot yet be reaped. This was 
for example the case with Eastern Europe in the 1990s, where people were 
confronted with an unexpected and unwanted rise in income inequality in the 
absence of promised economic growth. 
 What are other possible benefits of income inequality? One benefit could 
be that income inequality fosters the activity level of people, which 
subsequently boosts happiness. This explanation would fit the theory that 
happiness is a by-product of being ‘fully functioning’. Another effect could 
be that dispersion of incomes fosters variation in lifestyles and sub-cultures in 
society, which in its turn adds to the chance that individuals find a niche that 
fits their preferences. This explanation would fit the theory that happiness 
depends on optimal allocation of time and activities. Yet another possible 
explanation is that to attain income equality, a government must limit the 
freedom of individuals, which reduces happiness. In this view, the means 
nullify the benefits of the end. Lastly, income inequality is not just a source of 
frustration for the poor, it can also be seen as a promise, such as in the 
‘American Dream’. 
 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to explore and test these explanations 
in more detail. Suffice to say that the observed positive relationship between 
income inequality and happiness can be explained in terms of benefits and 
downsides operating simultaneously.  
 There are many reasons to oppose or defend income inequality in a nation. 
This study pertains to one of these arguments and shows that one cannot 
reject income inequality on the grounds of its consequences for happiness. 
One can defend income inequality on these grounds. This does not conclude 
the discussion on income inequality, but it does answer at least one issue with 
respect to such inequality. 
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11.10. CONCLUSION 
In the present day world, there is little relation between income inequality in 
nations and average happiness of citizens. Controlling for wealth, a slightly 
positive correlation emerges. There is no clear level of income inequality 
beyond which happiness declines. Income inequality is not correlated with the 
inequality in happiness after controlling for wealth. Although income 
inequality might have downsides, these are apparently outweighed by the 
positive aspects of income inequality. 
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ANNEX 11.A 
 
To calculate the Gini-coefficient for income inequality, we need the complete 
income distribution in a country. The Gini-coefficient is closely related to the 
so-called Lorenz curve that indicates to what extent a homogenous income 
distribution and the actual income distribution differ. The greater the 
percentage of the national income that is earned by the richest people, or the 
smaller the percentage that is earned by the poorest people, the greater the 
Gini-coefficient. The Gini-coefficient is often calculated using the more 
practical Brown formula: 
 
G: Gini-coefficient 
Xk: cumulated proportion of the population variable, k = 0, …, n, met X0 = 0, 
Xn = 1 
Yk: cumulated proportion of the income variable, k = 0,..., n, met Y0 = 0, Yn = 
1 
 The Gini-coefficient is between 0 and 1, 0 representing complete income 
equality, that is, everybody earns exactly the same, and 1 representing 
complete inequality, that is, one person earns the national income, while 
others have no income at all. 
 Ott (2005) notices that the reliability of the Gini-coefficient is not always 
perfect, especially in the case of non-Western countries. He warns us that the 
coefficients should be used carefully. When comparing income inequality in 
different nations, additional problems may arise.16 It is important, for 
example, that income is measured equally in all countries: that is, income or 
consumption? Net-income or gross income? Personal income or household 
income? Taking informal trade into account or not? When we look at 
household income, possible income differences between men and women will 
not appear, so that the picture differs from comparing individuals. The level 
of social services is also important, as social services fulfil part of the human 
needs in a society and decrease the role of income from wages. In Europe, 
income surveys exist that take into account other forms of income. These 
surveys are standardized in the ‘Luxembourg Income Studies’. This approach 
was not chosen for this research. Instead of using a small number of nations 
and a standardized income inequality operationalization, we chose a large 
number of nations in the expectation that this would diminish possible 
unreliabilities. When we studied the rank order of income inequality, the 
unreliability did not seem to be that great. Nations with an egalitarian 
reputation have lower Gini-coefficients than nations that are commonly 
believed to be unequal. 
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Annex 11.B 
 
 
 I II III IV V VI VII 
        
Albania                     
Algeria                     
Argentina                   
Armenia                     
Australia                   
Austria                     
Azerbaijan                  
Bangladesh                  
Belarus                     
Belgium                     
Benin                       
Bolivia                     
Bosnia 
Botswana                    
Brazil                      
Bulgaria                    
Burkina Fasso               
Burundi                     
Cambodia                    
Cameroon                    
Canada                      
Central African R   
Chile                       
China                       
Colombia                    
Costa Rica                  
Croatia                     
Czech Republic              
Denmark                     
Dominican Rep.          
Ecuador                     
Egypt                       
El Salvador                 
Estonia                     
Ethiopia                    
Finland                     
France                      
Georgia                     
Germany                     
4.6 
5.2 
7.5 
4.9 
7.7 
7.9 
5.4 
5.3 
4.2 
7.3 
4.3 
5.9 
5.3 
5.2 
7.4 
4.4 
5.1 
5.0 
4.4 
4.6 
7.6 
5.1 
6.8 
6.3 
8.1 
7.4 
6.1 
6.4
8.4 
5.7 
5.7 
5.1 
7.2 
5.9 
4.3 
7.8 
6.5 
4.4 
7.2 
2.50 
3.18 
2.32 
2.47 
2.02 
2.12 
2.25 
2.42 
2.46 
2.29 
2.28 
2.37 
2.66 
2.52 
2.33 
2.77 
2.42 
2.15 
2.30 
2.40 
2.06 
. 
2.33 
2.71 
2.16 
2.54 
2.59 
2.17 
2.02 
3.04 
2.65 
3.36 
2.60 
2.43 
2.23 
1.91 
2.19 
2.45 
1.99 
4.74 
5.91 
6.27 
4.21 
7.42 
7.12 
4.80 
4.31 
5.66 
7.39 
3.52 
5.36 
5.06 
4.63 
6.51 
3.77 
3.80 
4.38 
3.63 
3.92 
7.40 
. 
6.24 
4.77 
5.95 
7.04 
5.77 
6.42 
8.00 
5.13 
5.10 
5.23 
5.60 
5.36 
3.83 
7.61 
7.01 
3.62 
6.58 
1.81 
1.97 
2.01 
1.99 
1.46 
1.80 
1.59 
1.76 
1.77 
1.43 
1.63 
1.81 
2.36 
2.07 
2.62 
1.91 
1.56 
1.40 
1.68 
1.86 
1.56 
. 
2.19 
1.95 
2.44 
2.11 
2.15 
2.03 
1.35 
3.02 
2.31 
2.63 
2.23 
1.69 
1.75 
1.44 
1.66 
1.95 
1.80 
28 
21 
47 
21 
51 
53 
21 
38 
26 
49 
34 
40 
33 
43 
53 
34 
34 
34 
34 
35 
59 
34 
42 
48 
49 
59 
29 
36 
60 
52 
54 
35 
58 
40 
11 
54 
42 
19 
43 
31.1 
35.3 
51.3 
33.8 
35.2 
29.1 
36.5 
33.4 
29.7 
33.0 
36.5 
60.1 
26.2 
60.5 
57.0 
29.2 
39.5 
42.4 
41.7 
44.6 
32.6 
61.3 
54.9 
46.9 
58.6 
49.8 
29.0 
25.4 
24.7 
51.6 
53.6 
34.4 
52.4 
35.8 
30.0 
26.9 
32.7 
40.4 
28.3 
5,316 
7,062 
14,280 
4,945 
31,794 
33,700 
5,016 
2,053 
7,918 
32,119 
1,141 
2,819 
7,032 
12,387 
8,402 
9,032 
1,213 
699 
2,727 
2,299 
33,375 
1,224 
12,027 
6,757 
7,304 
10,180 
13,042 
20,538 
33,973 
6,393 
4,341 
4,337 
5,255 
15,478 
1,055 
32,153 
30,386 
3,365 
29,461 
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Ghana                       
Greece                      
Guatemala                   
Guinea                      
Haiti                       
Honduras                    
Hong Kong                    
Hungary                     
India                       
Indonesia                   
Iran                        
Ireland                     
Israel                      
Italy                       
Ivory Coast                 
Jamaica                     
Japan                       
Jordan                      
Kazakhstan                  
Kenya                       
Korea (South) 
Kyrgyzstan                  
Laos                        
Latvia                      
Lithuania                   
Macedonia                   
Madagascar                  
Malawi                      
Malaysia                    
Mali                        
Mauritania                  
Mexico                      
Moldova 
Mongolia                    
Morocco                     
Mozambique                  
Namibia                     
Nepal                       
Netherlands                 
New Zealand                 
Nicaragua                   
Niger                       
Nigeria                     
Norway                      
Pakistan                    
5.7 
6.4 
7.0 
5.0 
4.5 
6.5 
6.0 
5.5 
5.9 
6.6 
6.0 
7.5 
6.7 
6.8 
5.9 
6.6 
6.4 
6.0 
6.0 
5.2 
5.9 
6.1 
5.7 
5.1 
4.9 
4.6 
4.7 
4.8 
6.5 
5.7 
5.7 
8.0 
4.9 
5.2 
5.2 
5.2
5.5 
5.2 
7.5 
7.3 
5.4 
4.5 
6.5 
7.7 
4.3 
2.92 
2.43 
2.52 
. 
2.39 
2.87 
2.14 
2.71 
2.54 
2.34 
2.68 
2.01 
2.41 
2.14 
. 
2.43 
2.10 
3.01 
2.37 
2.31 
2.37 
2.86 
1.85 
2.66 
2.93 
3.02 
2.16 
2.54 
2.25 
2.88 
2.44 
2.48 
2.54 
. 
2.42 
2.36 
. 
2.23 
1.48 
2.07 
2.86 
2.26 
2.58 
2.26 
1.62 
4.86 
6.35 
6.01 
. 
3.76 
5.34 
5.67 
5.23 
5.97 
4.98 
5.29 
7.24 
7.16 
6.97 
. 
6.21 
6.49 
6.30 
5.49 
4.36 
5.68 
4.58 
5.11 
4.73 
5.93 
4.51 
4.01 
4.13 
6.08 
4.01 
5.20 
6.74 
4.93 
. 
4.59 
4.61 
. 
4.55 
7.56 
7.44 
4.80 
3.80 
4.73 
7.46 
6.12 
1.87 
2.27 
2.08 
. 
1.84 
2.71 
1.82 
2.04 
2.05 
1.70 
1.98 
1.83 
1.85 
1.73 
. 
1.91 
1.79 
2.01 
1.80 
1.70 
2.17 
1.75 
.85 
1.65 
1.83 
2.17 
1.41 
2.12 
1.59 
1.61 
1.93 
2.16 
1.89 
. 
1.96 
1.78 
. 
1.55 
1.15 
1.68 
2.70 
1.61 
1.78 
1.60 
2.38 
53 
41 
56 
. 
26 
52 
. 
42 
31 
54 
23 
60 
34 
39 
. 
53 
46 
36 
38 
62 
32 
32 
52 
33 
26 
40 
44 
52 
49 
60 
52 
58 
26 
30 
32 
42 
16 
51 
56 
53 
52 
50 
50 
56 
33 
40.8 
34.3 
55.1 
38.6 
59.2 
53.8 
43.4 
26.9 
36.8 
34.3 
43.0 
34.3 
39.2 
36.0 
44.6 
45.5 
24.9 
38.8 
33.9 
42.5 
31.6 
30.3 
34.6 
37.7 
36.0 
39.0 
47.5 
39.0 
49.2 
40.1 
39.0 
46.1 
33.2 
32.8 
39.5 
47.3 
74.3 
47.2 
30.9 
36.2 
43.1 
50.5 
43.7 
25.8 
30.6 
2,480 
23,381 
4,568 
2,316 
1,663 
3,430 
34,833 
17,887 
3,452 
3,843 
7,968 
38,505 
25,864 
28,529 
, 
4,291 
31,267 
5,530 
7,857 
1,240 
22,029 
1,927 
2,039 
13,646 
14,494 
7,200 
923 
667 
10,882 
1,033 
2,234 
10,751 
2,100 
2,107 
4,555 
1,242 
7,586 
1,550 
32,684 
24,996 
3,674 
781 
1,128 
41,420 
2,370 
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Panama                      
Paraguay                    
Peru                        
Philippines                 
Poland                      
Portugal                    
Romania                     
Russia         
Rwanda                      
Sierra Leone                
Singapore                   
Slovak Republic             
Slovenia                    
South Africa                
Spain                       
Sri Lanka                   
Sweden                      
Switzerland                 
Tajikistan                  
Tanzania                    
Thailand                    
Trinidad Tobago              
Tunesia                     
Turkey                      
Uganda                      
Ukraine                     
United Kingdom              
United States               
Uruguay                     
Uzbekistan                  
Venezuela                   
Vietnam                     
Yemen                       
Zambia                      
Zimbabwe                    
6.6 
5.4 
6.4 
6.3 
6.4 
5.7 
5.5 
5.4 
4.4 
4.6 
6.8 
5.6
6.8 
6.0 
7.2 
5.0 
7.7 
8.1 
5.3 
3.2 
6.9 
7.0
5.9 
5.5 
5.1 
4.8 
7.1 
7.0 
6.1 
6.1 
7.2 
6.5 
5.2 
5.6 
3.3 
2.66 
2.45 
2.58 
2.82 
2.53 
2.18 
2.87 
2.78 
2.34 
2.36 
1.91 
2.47 
2.28 
2.84 
1.90 
2.35 
1.92 
1.76 
2.24 
3.58 
2.01 
2.40 
. 
2.80 
2.74 
2.76 
1.98 
1.98 
2.64 
2.45 
2.78 
2.20 
2.44 
2.78 
3.04 
6.20 
4.86 
4.93 
4.73 
5.85 
5.43 
5.28 
5.00 
4.34 
3.88 
6.56 
5.16 
5.93 
5.37 
7.13 
4.34 
7.38 
7.45 
4.57 
4.04 
5.96 
5.78 
. 
. 
4.04 
4.88 
6.97 
7.26 
5.60 
5.22 
7.17 
5.33 
4.55 
4.92 
3.76 
2.33 
1.95 
2.21 
2.26 
2.08 
2.18 
2.29 
2.03 
1.55 
1.78 
1.27 
1.96 
1.95 
2.10 
1.75 
1.77 
1.63 
1.70 
1.56 
1.66 
1.67 
2.41 
. 
2.34 
1.72 
1.96 
1.63 
1.89 
2.30 
1.94 
2.55 
1.36 
1.93 
1.84 
1.97 
62 
61 
42 
36 
46 
39 
33 
40 
41 
28 
39 
32 
43 
47 
49 
41 
58 
52 
44 
45 
56 
52 
29 
32 
38 
35 
48 
54 
47 
49 
64 
47 
22 
52 
35 
56.1 
58.4 
52.0 
44.5 
34.5 
38.5 
31.0 
39.9 
46.8 
62.9 
42.5 
25.8 
28.4 
57.8 
34.7 
40.2 
25.0 
33.7 
32.6 
34.6 
42.0 
38.9 
39.8 
43.6 
45.7 
28.1 
36.0 
40.8 
44.9 
36.8 
48.2 
34.4 
33.4 
50.8 
50.1 
7,605 
4,642 
6,039 
5,137 
13,847 
20,410 
9,060 
10,845 
1,206 
806 
29,663 
15,871 
22,273 
11,110 
27,169 
4,595 
32,525 
35,633 
1,356 
744 
8,677 
14,603 
8,371 
8,407 
1,454 
6,848 
33,238 
41,890 
9,962 
2,063 
6,632 
3,071 
930 
1,023 
2,038 
  
I: Level of happiness 
II:  Disparity in happiness 
III: Level of contentment 
IV: Disparity in contentment 
V: Level of mood 
VI: Income inequality 
VII: Wealth 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1 Graham and Felton (2005) conclude that in Latin America inequality is 
perceived as a permanent edge of the haves over the have-nots. Inequality in 
this region is not associated with a brighter future for the poor. 
2 There are indications that mobile people, or people who think of themselves 
as mobile, even like inequality (for example Graham and Pettinato, 2002; 
Clark, 2003). 
3 This supposed greater social mobility in the US does not seem to exist in 
reality (McMurrer and Sawhill, 1998) 
4 Variable in date file StatesOfNations_2009 (Veenhoven, 2009b): 
IncomeInequality1_2005. 
5 Scores transformed to range 0-10. Since this particular question has not 
been used in all the 119 nations considered here we have also used responses 
to equivalent questions. See Veenhoven (2009b). 
6 Variable in data file StatesOfNations_2009 (Veenhoven, 2009b):  
Happiness_LSBW_2000.08.  
7 Variable in data file StatesOfNations_2009 (Veenhoven, 2009b):  
SD_Happiness_LSBW_2000.06. 
8 Variable in data file StatesOfNations_2009 (Veenhoven, 2009b):  
HappinessBW11_2006. 
9 Variable in data file StatesOfNations_2009 (Veenhoven, 2009b):  
SD_HappinessBW11_2006. 
10 Variable in data file StatesOfNations_2009 (Veenhoven, 2009b):  
HappinessYesterdayABS_2006.08. 
11 Variable in data file StatesOfNations_2009 (Veenhoven, 2009b): 
RGDP_2005. 
12 N varies between 119 and 108. 
13 Note that in this analysis all the nations have equal weights, and the size of 
the population is not taken into account. Although some nations are obviously 
bigger than others, the size of nations does not seem to be relevant for the 
relationship as such that is studied in this research. 
14 All plots or data that are not shown, but are mentioned in this chapter are 
available on request 
15 Alesina et al. (2004) write  on page 2028: ’A 10% increase in the Gini 
decreases the proportion of people reporting themselves very satisfied by 
5.5% and increases the proportion reporting themselves as ‘not very/not at all 
satisfied by 5.3 percentage points”. When applied on the actual distribution of 
responses this means a difference of 0.08 on range 1-3. When transformed to 
range 0-10 using the value 9’.3 for ‘very satisfied’, 6.5 for ‘fairly satisfied’ 
and  3 for the ‘dissatisfied category, the difference is about one point. 
16 In this sense it is easier not to study the relation between income inequality 
and happiness, but (also) the relation between inequality in happiness and 
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average happiness. Ott (2005) does exactly this in his paper. He concludes 
that high average scores go together with low standard deviations and that the 
tension between egalitarianism and utilitarianism is more theoretical than 
existent in the real world.  
